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A NEW ERA OF LEGAL SERVICES: THE 
ELIMINATION OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF 




 Since the inception of bar associations in the early twentieth 
century, states have promulgated rules that prohibit unlicensed 
individuals from providing legal services. These unauthorized 
practice of law rules have created a monopoly on legal services, 
which in turn has inflated the price of obtaining legal services to a 
point where a significant percentage of individuals who need such 
services are unable to obtain them. Legal software has the potential 
to disrupt the market for legal services and make such services 
available to the mass market. However, for innovation and wide-
spread use of legal software to gain traction, these unauthorized 
practice of law rules must be eliminated. In their place, various 
guards must be adopted by state and federal legal authorities to 
ensure consumers are protected following the elimination of un-
authorized practice of law rules, including but not limited to the 
expansion of current false advertising and malpractice law. 
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, Class of 2021. Bachelor of 
Science in Economics, George Mason University. The author would like to 
thank his parents for their endless support throughout law school and his 
academic journey. He would also like to acknowledge the William & Mary 
Business Law Review Staff and Editorial Board for their continuous effort 
and dedication in preparing this Note for publication. 
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INTRODUCTION
 In modern society, it would certainly seem as though to 
purchase legal services, one would need to speak to a licensed 
attorney. However, with the proliferation of technology, new ave-
nues of obtaining legal services have emerged.1 It may come as a 
surprise that before the twentieth century, individuals did not 
always need to have a law degree to provide legal services.2
Through the passing of unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) rules, 
states created a monopoly on legal services under the facade of 
protecting the consumer from mediocre representation.3 Instead, 
states created a gap in justice where those individuals most in 
need of legal services, such as low-income households, are una-
ble to access those services because of monopoly prices.4 That is 
where legal software comes in.5
 Legal software is able to cut down the cost of legal services, 
thereby allowing more consumers to enter the market.6 However, 
UPL rules have disturbed the proliferation of the software from 
entering the market and created uncertainty regarding its future.7
This Note dives into the history of UPL rules and their effect on the 
market, and the prevalence of legal software. Part I explores the 
history and origination of UPL laws and their development over 
the decades and through different states. Part II discusses the 
drawbacks and effects of UPL laws on the legal market and related 
software and advocates for their elimination. Part III discusses 
possible avenues of consumer protection when UPL rules are 
1 See, e.g., LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/personal/estate-plan 
ning/living-trust-overview.html [https://perma.cc/6AX6-GKUX]. 
2 RUSSELL G. PEARCE ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A CONTEM-
PORARY APPROACH 27 (3d. ed. 2017). 
3 Mathew Rotenberg, Note, Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of 
Law and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 714–15 (2012). 
4 See Cynthia L. Fountaine, When Is a Computer a Lawyer?: Interactive 
Legal Software, Unauthorized Practice of Law, and the First Amendment, 71 
U. CIN. L. REV. 147, 148 (2002). 
5 Paul F. Kirgis, The Knowledge Guild: The Legal Profession in an Age of 
Technological Change, 11 NEV. L.J. 184, 196 (2010) (reviewing RICHARD SUSSKIND,
THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2008)).
6 See William H. Brown, Comment, Legal Software and the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law: Protection or Protectionism, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 157, 160 (1999). 
7 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39. 
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eliminated, while Part IV discusses the effects of monopolies and 
the economics of a free market without such monopolies. 
I. THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED 
PRACTICE OF LAW RULES
 Although it would seem that lawyers have held a tight grip 
on the practice of law since the inception of the profession, the 
scope of the monopoly on legal services has varied over time.8 In 
fact, until the twentieth century, non-lawyer-run businesses and 
non-profits often provided transactional and litigation services, 
retaining an attorney only when it was necessary to appear in 
court on behalf of the organization or client.9
 Following their creation in the early twentieth century, 
numerous bar associations began to adopt the goal of conditioning 
bar membership on certain educational requirements.10 The New 
York County Lawyers Association took the lead on this movement 
and appointed the first committee in 1914 on the unauthorized 
practice of law in response to a growing business industry that 
was overlapping with legal work.11 After New York, numerous state 
bar associations followed suit in the decades following and created 
their own UPL statutes or even broadened the scope of UPL laws 
they already had.12 In 1930, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
created its own committee on the unauthorized practice of law.13
By 1938, over 400 similar committees had been established across 
the nation.14 Once state courts began implementing versions of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct into their UPL rules 
during the second half of the twentieth century, UPL regulation 
became more standard across the country.15
 However, although the Model Rules prompted widespread 
adoption of UPL rules, the definition of the practice of law itself 
8 Id. at 27. 
9 Id.
10 Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 713. 
11 Id.
12 Id. at 713–14. 
13 Id. at 714. 
14 Id.
15 Id.
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chosen by each jurisdiction has become anything but uniform.16
The Model Rules themselves fail to provide a standard definition, 
stating instead, “[t]he definition of the practice of law is established 
by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another.”17 Further, 
these various definitions themselves are not always derived from 
statutes.18 In some states, the definition of what constitutes the 
practice of law is found instead through case law.19
 Another problem rests with interpreting these rules—
“While almost all states ... currently have statutes that purport 
to define the practice of law, in reality these statutes tend to be 
vague in scope and contain broad qualifiers.”20 These qualifiers 
fail to provide concrete guidance to courts and state bar agencies 
on what can confidently be labeled as the practice of law.21 For 
example, in Texas, the UPL statute provides, “[t]he definition in 
this section is not exclusive and does not deprive the judicial 
branch of the power and authority ... to determine whether other 
services and acts not enumerated may constitute the practice of 
law.”22 Open-ended definitions such as this confuse entities at-
tempting to apply the rules to different activities that seem legal.23
As a result, different interpretations have emerged attempting 
to encircle what acts constitute the practice of law.24
 One such interpretation states that the practice of law en-
tails those acts that were “traditionally performed” by lawyers, 
with some exceptions.25 Another test revolves around whether 
an attorney-client relationship (explained below) has been created 
by law.26 What is clear from these split interpretations is that it 
16 See id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment Let-
ter on American Bar Association’s Proposed Model Definition of the Practice 
of Law (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/20 
08/03/26/200604.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN56-FUQD] [hereinafter Comment Letter]. 
17 Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Prepara-
tion and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 812 (2002). 
18 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 28. 
19 Id.
20 See Comment Letter, supra note 16. 
21 See id.
22 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(b) (West 1999). 
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is inherently difficult to define the practice of law and the scope 
of activities that are traditionally held by lawyers.27
 Another difficulty with UPL rules has been applying the 
varying interpretations to different activities: 
[T]here are an increasing number of situations where nonlawyers 
are providing services that are difficult to categorize under 
current statutes and case law as being, or not being, the delivery 
of legal services. This growing gray area may be partially respon-
sible for the spotty enforcement of unauthorized practice of law 
statutes across the nation and [arguably] an increasing num-
ber of attendant problems related to the delivery of services 
by nonlawyers.28
 In the seminal case of Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, the Su-
preme Court of Florida delineated certain activities being performed 
by a secretary as engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.29
The secretary had been preparing legal documents in uncontested 
marriage dissolutions.30 The court stated that while performing 
services like printing standardized forms is not improper, these 
activities cross the line into the unauthorized practice of law 
when the preparer assists parties on how to fill out the form or 
advises consumers on possible remedies specific to their situa-
tion.31 The fine line between constituting the practice of law was 
drawn by the court when there is a consultation that directly 
addresses the client’s situation, but not when a preparer stand-
ardizes or creates his or her product without such advising.32
The court’s ruling exemplified this principle when the court held 
that the secretary was allowed to copy the information on legal 
forms that she obtained from her former business but could not 
directly advise the client on how to prepare the form.33
27 PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 28. 
28 Comment Letter, supra note 16 (quoting A.B.A., CHALLENGE STATEMENT:
MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.ameri 
canbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/task_force_model_definition
_practice_law/model_definition_challenge/ [https://perma.cc/XV3E-DQ8M]). 
29 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978). 
30 Id. at 1189. 
31 Id. at 1194. 
32 Id.
33 Id.
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 The same principle in Brumbaugh was present in Dacey v. 
New York County Lawyers’ Association.34 In Dacey, New York’s 
highest court agreed with the dissent opinion of the lower court,35
which held that a legal advice book titled How to Avoid Probate! 
did not violate any UPL rules.36 Specifically, regarding a legal help 
book sold to the general public, Justice Stevens stated in his dissent, 
“[t]here is no personal contact or relationship with a particular 
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and 
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client.”37 Justice 
Stevens elaborated on the idea that such a freely purchased me-
dium that purports to offer advice on common problems does not 
create the level of personal reliance that is present in an attorney-
client relationship.38
 “As computer technology advances at an astonishing rate, 
the law often struggles to keep pace with the corresponding de-
velopment of new issues of law or, at the very least, new twists 
to existing law.”39 Brumbaugh and Dacey made clear that a level 
of intimate personal relationship had to be present between a client 
and the source of legal aid to violate UPL rules.40 Such a rela-
tionship did not exist between either a consumer and a book sold 
to the public, or between a client and a secretary providing un-
tailored copy and print services of legal documents.41
 However, a different situation arises when the provider of 
legal services is instead computerized software that provides par-
ticularized legal documents tailored to a consumer’s input of in-
formation.42 One of the first cases on this topic came from Texas: 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology.43
This case involved the Quicken Family Lawyer software, which 
34 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 35. 
35 See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459, 459 (N.Y. 1967). 
36 See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 28 A.D.2d 161, 174–75 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1967) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 174. 
38 See id. at 174–75. 
39 Steve French, Note, When Public Policies Collide ... Legal “Self-Help” Soft-
ware and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH.
L.J. 93 (2001). 
40 See Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978); PEARCE 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 35–36.
41 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 34–35. 
42 See id. at 37–38. 
43 No. Civ. A. 3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999). 
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“offer[ed] over 100 different legal forms[, ]such as employment 
agreements[ or] real estate leases ... along with instructions on 
how to fill out [the] forms.”44 The software itself worked by asking 
preliminary questions and then provided tailored documents 
specific to each consumer’s situation.45 The Texas district court 
explained that this dynamic went beyond a simple book instruction 
guide and constituted the practice of law, and the court conse-
quently enjoined the sale of the software.46
 Similar to the Quicken software, a more modern software 
and service from LegalZoom has come under scrutiny from the 
courts for its intrusion into the legal market.47 The LegalZoom 
software provides various legal forms in numerous areas, including 
Limited Liability Company (LLC) formation, estate planning, 
trademark, and even bankruptcy.48 Applying the principles from 
Brumbaugh, LegalZoom providing blank legal documents does 
not run afoul of UPL rules.49 Where LegalZoom runs into trouble is 
with its tailored legal services.50 At the consumer’s request, the 
program will convey questionnaires to a client and return com-
pleted legal documents that integrate the answers provided from 
the questionnaires.51 After the consumer completes the ques-
tionnaires, LegalZoom’s document assistants review the answers 
on the generated document for consistency and accuracy.52 Going a 
step further, once the document has been reviewed and printed, 
LegalZoom then sends the document to the consumer with spe-
cific instructions on how to finalize the document.53
 Numerous jurisdictions have taken a hostile position and 
asserted that LegalZoom’s consumer-tailored model constitutes 
the unauthorized practice of law.54 In North Carolina, the State 
44 See id. at *1.  
45 See id. at *1–2. 
46 Id. at *6. 
47 PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39. 
48 LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/ [https://perma.cc/5BMF-R3MN]; 
see Isaac Figueras, Comment, The LegalZoom Identity Crisis: Legal Form Provider 
or Lawyer in Sheep’s Clothing?, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1419, 1423 (2013). 
49 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 28. 
50 See generally LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 
2014 WL 1213242, at *1–2 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Mar. 24, 2014).
51 Id. at *6. 
52 Id.
53 PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 41. 
54 Id. at 39; see LegalZoom.com, Inc., 2014 WL 1213242, at *1–2. 
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Bar put teeth to this argument by prohibiting the program from 
offering its services to the state.55 In response, LegalZoom filed 
suit, arguing the State Bar exceeded its statutory powers by taking 
such action, with the State Bar counterclaiming on the grounds 
of the UPL.56 Once all pleadings were submitted, the trial court 
denied the state bar’s request for judgment on the pleadings.57
The court found that although LegalZoom’s program did not con-
stitute a form of self-representation, it was unsure whether to 
apply the Brumbaugh principles to LegalZoom.58 In other words, 
the court was unsure about whether to label LegalZoom as a pro-
gram that provides express or tailored legal judgment using in-
put from information provided by a client.59
The case came to an abrupt halt when the parties signed 
a consent judgment that deemed LegalZoom not to have violated 
UPL rules so long as it (1) provided a North Carolina consumer 
of LegalZoom a means to see the blank template or finalized 
template before purchase; (2) retained an attorney licensed to prac-
tice in North Carolina to review the blank templates being of-
fered; (3) made an explicit communication to consumers that the 
forms and templates are not a substitute for the services of an 
attorney; (4) disclosed its legal name and physical location; (5) 
did not disclaim any warranties or liabilities and did not limit the 
recovery of damages; and (6) did not force a consumer in North 
Carolina to agree to jurisdiction or venue in any state other than 
North Carolina should any dispute arise.60
 As technology evolves, UPL rules may even infringe on 
the future of smart contracts.61 The smart contract is a digital 
agreement that self-executes after the completion of a certain 
function, similar to how a vending machine disburses a drink after 
coins have been entered into the machine.62 Specifically, “[t]he 
55 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39. 
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See LegalZoom.com, Inc., 2014 WL 1213242, at *14; PEARCE ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 39.
59 PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39.
60 LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2015 WL 
6441853 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Oct. 22, 2015). 
61 See Sarah Templin, Blocked-Chain: The Application of the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law to Smart Contracts, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 957, 957 (2019). 
62 Id. at 959. 
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blockchain allows for automation of the execution of the con-
tract, with the contract embodied within the code of the block-
chain....”63 This ingenuity may infringe on the practice of law as 
non-lawyers such as coders may be able to prepare contracts while 
securing legal rights for consumers of smart contracts in the per-
formance of the contract.64
 Looking towards the future, the application of UPL rules 
on advancing technology can be intimidating with the uncertainty 
stemming from not only broad definitions of the practice of law, 
but also the mixed reactions given to activities that might en-
croach on these definitions.65
II. THE EFFECTS OF UPL RULES ON THE LEGAL 
MARKET AND LEGAL SOFTWARE
 The question to be asked regarding the up-and-coming prom-
inence of legal software is what purpose do UPL rules serve? The 
most common rationale is that these regulations protect the public 
from ineffectual legal services.66 “According to the ABA Model 
Rules, ‘[l]imiting the practice of law to members of the bar pro-
tects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified 
persons.’”67 According to this theory, untrained individuals per-
forming legal services for a consumer can lead to the client’s 
harm while also causing further expense and litigation as a re-
sult.68 However, the strongest of these arguments is that unli-
censed individuals who perform legal services are not subject to 
rules concerning confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and attorney-
client privilege.69
 While the arguments supporting the relevance of UPL 
rules are valid, there may be other arguments for why they exist 
underneath the facade of public policy.70 “Unauthorized practice 
63 Id.
64 Id. at 968. 
65 See Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978) (Karl, J., 
concurring specially). 
66 Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 714. 
67 Id. at 714–15 (citing MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 1 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1995)). 
68 Id. at 715. 
69 Id.
70 See id.
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statutes unquestionably shield the profession from most external 
competition.... [I]t is clear from empirical study that public policy 
concerns were not the only driving forces behind the expansion 
and strengthening of unauthorized practice of law statutes.”71 This 
rationale is not without its support from legal scholars.72 Accord-
ing to Professor Catherine Lanctot from Villanova University Law 
School, “Lawyers historically have used the unauthorized prac-
tice of law statutes to protect against perceived incursions by real 
estate agents, bankers, insurance adjusters, and other groups 
that seemed to be providing legal services.”73 Even the promi-
nence of smart contracts created through blockchain poses this 
threat, as the creation of self-executing and self-enforcing con-
tracts to secure legal rights will thus intrude on what was tradi-
tionally a function of an attorney.74
 The significance of UPL rules has consistently come into 
question.75
Denial of access to justice is not merely a theoretical defect in 
the administration of justice; it has deep practical ramifications. 
Lacking effective representation, poor persons often see the law 
not as a protector, but as an enemy which evicts them from their 
flat, victimizes them as consumers, cancels their welfare pay-
ments, binds them to usury, and seizes their children.76
 Criticism has also come from the federal government.77 In 
a joint letter from the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission, both agencies urged the American Bar Asso-
ciation not to adopt the overbroad definition it proposed to im-
plement for it ran the risk of constraining competition between 
lawyers and nonlawyers providing similar services to the pub-
lic.78 As stated by the agencies, “There is no evidence before the 
71 Id. at 715–16. 
72 Comment Letter, supra note 16, at 3. 
73 Id. (quoting Possible Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on 
the Internet: Federal Trade Commission Public Workshop (Oct. 9, 2002) (statement 
of Catherine J. Lanctot)). 
74 See Templin, supra note 61, at 969. 
75 See Brown, supra note 6, at 170. 
76 Id. at 161 (quoting Jerome J. Shestack, Will Justice Be Rationed?, 80
MARQ. L. REV. 727, 727 (1997)). 
77 Comment Letter, supra note 16, at 16. 
78 Id. at 4. 
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ABA of which we are aware that consumers are hurt by this com-
petition and there is substantial evidence that they benefit from 
it. Consequently, we recommend that the proposed Model Defi-
nition be substantially narrowed or rejected.”79
 With the validity of UPL rules existing on thin ice,80 it is 
more appropriate to examine the effect of these rules as they 
bear on the demographic they were created by legal authorities to 
protect, the legal consumer.81 UPL statutes unfairly and over-
whelmingly affect populations of limited means or income.82 The 
problem only aggregates when considering that there is not enough 
availability of pro bono lawyers to meet the needs of these indi-
viduals and families.83
 The necessity of making legal services accessible to popula-
tions of limited means is an area of extensive study.84 LegalZoom’s 
own 2012 prospectus states, “Despite the enormous amount spent 
on legal services, we believe that small businesses and consum-
ers have not been adequately served by the options traditionally 
available to them.”85 A report by the American Bar Association 
in 1995 concluded that 70–80% or more of low-income individu-
als could not access legal assistance when they needed or wanted 
it.86 Further, in 2017, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) es-
timated that low-income Americans would “approach LSC-
funded legal aid organizations for support with an estimated 1.7 
million problems.... [While] receiv[ing] only limited or no legal help 
for more than half of these problems because of a lack of re-
sources.”87 A study by Temple University found that in Florida, 
the legal system addressed less than one-third of legal problems 
79 Id. at 3. 
80 See id. at 16. 
81 Brown, supra note 6, at 172. 
82 Derek A. Denckla, Response, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice 
of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2581 (1999). 
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 Figueras, supra note 48, at 1421 (quoting LegalZoom.com, Inc., Regis-
tration Statement (Form S-1), at 1 (May 10, 2012)). 
86 Fountaine, supra note 4, at 147. 
87 The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income 
Americans, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (June 2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files 
/images/TheJusticeGap-ExecutiveSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JTG-NAJV]. 
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among low- and moderate-income families.88 Cost concerns were 
the most common barrier to accessing legal services.89 This gap 
in access to legal services by those who need them does not af-
fect low-income households solely: 
The justice gap—that is, the gap between legal needs and ser-
vices available—has the greatest implications for the United 
States’ most vulnerable populations: those at greatest risk 
under the policies announced by the incoming administration. 
On the civil side, people of color, women, immigrants, the elderly, 
people with disabilities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-
gender, or LGBT, people are more likely to live in poverty and 
more likely to need legal assistance. Claiming protections under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, often requires, 
at a minimum, legal advice, and at most, litigation.90
 The unfortunate result of the justice gap is that it not only 
severely affects populations struggling in poverty, but also per-
petuates that poverty.91 The question to ask is whether main-
taining a monopoly on legal services through UPL rules is worth 
the inaccessibility of legal services by households that desper-
ately need them. 
 Despite the imbalance of access to legal services, in 2016, 
a staggering 89.3% of households in the United States owned a 
computer in their home.92 The proposed solution is clear with 
these statistics: eliminate UPL rules and allow legal software to 
enter the market to help reduce the justice gap.93
 It is no new development that legal services are expen-
sive.94 On the contrary, self-help channels to legal services are 
88 Brown, supra note 6, at 159. 
89 Id.
90 Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, Making Justice Equal, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS




92 Percentage of Households in the United States with a Computer at Home 
from 1984 to 2016, STATISTA (Aug. 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics 
/214641/household-adoption-rate-of-computer-in-the-us-since-1997/ [https:// 
perma.cc/J43H-SQXU]. 
93 See Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 90 (defining the justice gap); Brown, 
supra note 6, at 160 (stating that legal self-help materials can help reduce 
the justice gap). 
94 See Brown, supra note 6, at 159. 
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relatively cheap and increase access to justice.95 Legal software 
specifically can address the deficiencies regarding access to ser-
vices in a multitude of fields.96 For example, regarding end-of-
life decision-making or no-contest divorces, there is no need to 
pay monopoly prices to an attorney if software is able to com-
plete the same mundane tasks.97 As LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. 
North Carolina State Bar showed, there is a growing acceptance 
towards legal software entering the legal services market.98 By 
rescinding UPL rules, the barriers to access can be eliminated 
by legal authorities on a nationwide basis without having to 
fight isolated battles in each state that end in settlements with 
no clear greenlight for legal software to proliferate.99 Indeed, 
even LegalZoom itself is at odds with its own software.100 Al-
though LegalZoom clearly indicates that it is not a law firm and 
is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney, the company 
accedes to concerns that it may be practicing law.101 In doing so, 
LegalZoom provides caution that its services may not be legal 
depending on the jurisdiction and evolution of UPL rules.102 Un-
certainty is the bane of business, and removing UPL rules will 
remove uncertainty in a business model similar to how Legal-
Zoom conducts its business.103
III. PROTECTING THE CONSUMER WITHOUT UPL RULES
 Of course, it is noteworthy to state that UPL laws are not 
useless pieces of legislation created without purpose.104 Becoming 
an attorney licensed to practice law is no easy task; it requires, in 
most states,105 completing law school as one of the preliminary 
95 Id. at 159–60. 
96 See id. at 160–61. 
97 See id.
98 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39–41. 
99 See id. at 44. 
100 See Figueras, supra note 48, at 1424. 
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1424–25. 
103 See id. at 1425. 
104 See Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 714–15. 
105 Zachary Crockett, How to Be a Lawyer Without Going to Law School,
PRICEONOMICS (Jan. 6, 2017), https://priceonomics.com/how-to-be-a-lawyer-with 
out-going-to-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/7C58-89VH]. 
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steps.106 From there, a law student needs to pass both a Multi-
state Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) and bar 
exam to become a fully licensed attorney.107 Therefore, it is ra-
tional to state that those individuals who provide legal services 
have a background and education to help them provide a degree 
of quality legal work and a code of ethics apart from those who 
have not surpassed such trials.108
 Further, attorneys have an obligation to behave profes-
sionally even after the hurdles of the MPRE and bar exam.109
Although a lawyer’s character is evaluated to gain admittance to 
the practice, those same ethical standards must be consistently 
maintained by the lawyer to continue to practice.110 Individuals 
who exhibit bad conduct or poor judgment at any point while being 
licensed may be disbarred or punished depending on the severity 
of their actions.111 These standards help ensure an adherence to 
a professional code of conduct in the legal profession.112
 As mentioned, UPL laws then, in effect, attempt to pro-
tect the public from individuals who have not achieved the level 
of specialized education of a licensed lawyer or who do not have 
to conform to a professional standard of conduct.113 Indeed, 
commentary to the District of Columbia rule on the unauthor-
ized practice of law provides four general purposes for the rule: 
(1) protecting members of the public from unqualified represen-
tation; (2) ensuring individuals who identify themselves as lawyers 
or their services as legal are held to the D.C. Bar’s disciplinary 
system; (3) maintaining efficiency and integrity within the jus-
tice system and regulation of lawyers; and (4) ensuring the D.C. 
Bar is financially supported by those who are members of the 
D.C. Bar.114
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 These arguments are certainly viable.115 However, they 
are also subject to pitfalls.116 The assumption that protecting the 
consumer public by ensuring that “unqualified parties” do not 
provide legal services assumes that those who are not qualified 
would provide incompetent, or less effective, legal services.117 This is 
a flawed assumption.118 Although licensed lawyers do have spe-
cialized knowledge, that does not mean they are otherwise more 
qualified to perform certain tasks.119 For example, “nonlawyer 
advocates who advise tenants on a daily basis about how to trek 
through the thicket of New York City’s housing court often help 
train lawyers who are volunteering their services to poor ten-
ants pro bono.”120 It is difficult to argue that providing services 
such as printing standardized forms tailored to individuals, as 
was the case in Brumbaugh, requires any more than basic train-
ing.121 If these services can be provided to consumers at a much 
more affordable price while still maintaining the integrity of the 
work’s quality,122 there is little reason to maintain a monopoly of 
legal services in favor of licensed lawyers. 
 The protections offered to consumers regarding ethical 
and moral rules imposed on a lawyer are subject to the same 
scrutiny.123 Although there is an intricate framework of rules 
and regulations that govern a lawyer’s code of conduct, studies 
of the attorney discipline system reveal that lawyers are rarely 
reprimanded by the legal system for their shortcomings or in-
competence.124 According to one Professor, if non-lawyers were 
able to practice law, “[t]he law of malpractice, contract and fiduciary 
limits on fee charges, and agency rules requiring loyalty to a princi-
pal would probably protect clients almost as well [as the lawyer 
discipline system].”125 Indeed, while there has been a growing 
115 See Denckla, supra note 82, at 2593. 
116 See id. at 2594–95, 2597. 




121 See Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1978). 
122 See Brown, supra note 6, at 159–61. 
123 See Denckla, supra note 82, at 2594–95. 
124 Id. at 2594. 
125 Id. at 2595 (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 831 
(Practitioner’s ed. 1986)). 
2020] A NEW ERA OF LEGAL SERVICES 263 
movement in the business world for corporations to adhere to a 
code of business ethics, commentaries have suggested that the 
opposite has been present within the legal community, where a 
decline in professionalism has been observed.126
 One would think that UPL rules, championing the protection 
of the consumer, would garner public support for their existence. 
However, numerous incidents exemplify that this is not the case.127
“[N]ational organizations with large membership bases, such as 
the American Association of Retired Persons, have campaigned 
to end UPL restrictions because the consumer public is not being 
served effectively by lawyers and should have a choice as to who 
represents them.”128 In Arizona, citizens had an opportunity to 
vote through a referendum on whether to approve of UPL rules.129
The result ended with a majority of the votes in favor of reject-
ing those rules.130
 To adequately protect consumers in a society without UPL 
rules, the legal landscape must continue to hold bad and negli-
gent actors liable. Legal malpractice claims exist to redress an 
injury an individual has received from a licensed lawyer’s negli-
gence or intent to harm the consumer.131 The same protections 
would need to include any provider of legal services and ensure 
non-lawyers are also potentially liable for legal malpractice suits.132
Specifically, legal malpractice claims would need to provide a 
private right of action to consumers of legal services against par-
ties that provide legal services rather than specifically against 
licensed attorneys.133
 For this to be successful, the expansion of legal malpractice 
would have to be mostly parallel in its structure when applied to 
unlicensed individuals or entities providing legal services.134 Legal 
malpractice, although varying from state to state,135 typically 
126 Denckla, supra note 82, at 2595. 
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requires (1) an existing attorney-client relationship that “placed 
a duty upon the attorney to exercise reasonable professional care, 
skill, and knowledge in providing legal services[,] ... (2) a breach of 
that duty[,]” and (3) harm or damage caused by a breach of that 
duty.136 The issue between expanding legal malpractice claims to 
non-lawyers arises from the existence of an attorney-client rela-
tionship and the breach of the duty that relationship imposes.137
 The attorney-client relationship is a fundamental princi-
ple in the legal field that serves to protect the interests of the 
party seeking legal services.138 This “duty,” placed upon an at-
torney to his clients, is encoded within the American Bar Associ-
ation Model Rules of Professional Conduct and provides, among 
other protections, that the attorney will keep certain communi-
cations between the attorney and the client private and that the 
attorney will provide competent representation.139 The attorney-
client relationship can be formed by an attorney with even pro-
spective clients.140 Although the exact definition varies from state to 
state,141 failure to uphold the duty can lead to legal malpractice 
claims against the attorney.142
 Where the expansion of legal malpractice claims to non-
attorneys will need to diverge from the traditional factors is 
regarding this attorney-client relationship.143 As mentioned ear-
lier, the attorney-client relationship is imposed on an attorney 
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by professional codes of conduct that hold the attorney liable for 
failing to uphold the minimum standards of conduct.144 Since 
this relationship or the state’s code of professional conduct does 
not bind a non-lawyer, the first element requiring an attorney-
client relationship would have to instead impose a general pro-
fessional duty on the provider of the legal service rather than an 
“attorney” client privilege.145 This professional duty is not a new 
phenomenon or one that is not already present in other fields; 
the first element in medical malpractice requires this exact rela-
tionship.146 Risks are associated with seeking legal services from 
a provider not licensed to practice law, as state professional codes 
of conduct do not bind these providers as they do lawyers.147
However, these risks are inherent with choosing legal software 
or unlicensed individuals over a licensed attorney, and certainly 
do not automatically represent any less quality services.148
 Another avenue of recourse for a party would be through 
false advertising claims.149 With an end on the legal monopoly, 
bad actors who would mislead consumers on the nature or quality 
of their services may enter the market.150 In order to provide a 
smooth transition following the elimination of UPL statutes, 
protections for consumers against these actors in the market need 
to exist to ensure that the quality of legal services do not mislead 
consumers.151 There are both state and federal laws on false ad-
vertising, and, in the states that do not have specific false adver-
tising avenues, common law fraud is a cause of action to reprimand 
these actors.152
 An abundance of case law restricts law firms and lawyers 
from making false claims on the type or expertise of their 
services,153 and this same line of reasoning should be applied to 
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any legal service provider rather than only lawyers or law firms.154
For instance, regarding attorney advertising, New Jersey held 
that these types of advertisements need to be predominantly 
informational, whereas drawings, animations, music, and lyrics 
are limited to television advertising.155 Meanwhile in Rhode Is-
land, listing areas of expertise is restricted when lawyers or law 
firms advertise.156 In Carter v. Lovett & Linder, Ltd., the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island upheld a decision by the disciplinary board 
against a law firm that listed specific areas of expertise when 
advertising the firm.157 In that case, the court clarified that this 
restriction applies even in instances in which an individual can 
perceive an area of expertise, even if it is not explicitly stated in 
the advertisement.158 These varying state principles must have 
a parallel application to any legal service provided by non-
lawyers to create an effective avenue of protecting consumers in 
a world without UPL rules.159
 Federal false advertising law is another avenue to protect 
consumers.160 The Lanham Act enables parties to pursue civil law-
suits for advertisements that “‘misrepresent[] the nature, char-
acteristics, qualities, or geographic origin’ of goods or services.”161
Implementing similar rigid protections that safeguard consumers 
at the advertising stage can minimize and, over time, hopefully 
eliminate the potential drawbacks of eliminating UPL statutes.162
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF A MONOPOLY ON THE LEGAL MARKET
 “Senator Henry Clay was right when he told the U.S. 
Senate in 1832, ‘[o]f all human powers operating on the affairs of 
mankind, none is greater than that of competition.’”163 As stated 
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earlier, UPL rules have created a monopoly on legal services.164
Absent government intervention, a monopoly can choose any price 
for its goods or services, and it will do so in a manner that will 
yield the highest possible profits.165 A monopoly can charge prices 
above what they would be when other competitors are able to enter 
the market.166 “When the monopolist raises prices above the com-
petitive level in order to reap his monopoly profits, customers 
buy less of the product, less is produced, and society as a whole 
is worse off. In short, monopoly reduces society’s income.”167 Un-
fortunately, this becomes an issue of public policy when a mo-
nopoly dominates in a market whose services are critical to the 
public, such as legal services, and a portion of the public is una-
ble to access these services because of high prices.168 However, 
the solution to ending this monopoly is simple on its face: elimi-
nate UPL rules. 
 Monopolies similar to the one present in the legal market 
are not a new phenomenon devoid of solutions and debate.169 In 
the field of medicine, prominent twentieth century economist 
Milton Friedman argued that state licensing procedures limited 
entry into the medical profession.170 This barrier allowed li-
censed doctors to charge fees higher than what would be the case 
had the competition been more open.171
 The very notion of a closed market in this fashion distorts 
basic principles of supply and demand.172 In the process of pri-
vate contracting and the exchange of goods and services, infor-
mation is signaled through prices.173 In a normal free market 
scenario, sellers cut prices to attract buyers, whereas buyers signal 
their preferences for specific goods and services by increasing 
164 See Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 713–14. 
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what they are willing to pay for such products.174 When the “price[] 
exceed[s the] cost[], sellers make a profit.”175 This has the effect of 
drawing competitors to the specific market, thus driving down 
prices due to a supply increase in what is known as price compe-
tition.176 Resultingly, when access to a market by sellers is barri-
caded, price competition is not able to flourish due to the limited 
number of sellers.177
 Lower prices are not the only benefit from an open mar-
ket.178 Competitors often improve their products and services to 
gain an advantage over rivals.179 “Competitive rivalry among 
suppliers and buyers is a powerful incentive to search for knowl-
edge. Self-interest motivates ceaseless, widespread, and often 
costly efforts to make the best use of one’s property and skills.”180
This is the process of innovation that brings new products to 
consumers or improves upon currently existing ones.181 In this 
sense, the possibilities for innovation in the legal market are end-
less. Products similar to LegalZoom may enter the market in 
droves, not only providing similar services but driving down 
prices to grab more of a market share.182 Lower prices will shrink 
the justice gap allowing more and more consumers to fulfill their 
legal needs.183 Innovation in the market would open the possibil-
ity of expanding the services offered by such products, thus not 
only increasing the number of legal services offered by technology, 
but further driving prices down as roles traditionally attributed 
to attorneys become digital.184 However, decreasing prices should 
not cause alarm about overall revenue in the market.185 Lower 
prices mean more consumers are able to participate in the market, 
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holders towards sellers who can provide the best quality products 
at the best available price.186
 Monopolies disrupt the delicate balance between supply 
and demand.187 The difficulty is ending the consolidation of mar-
ket share owned by monopoly forces. Over the long term, mo-
nopolies survive as a result of government protection.188 There is 
a certain irony when the legal market’s protection comes from 
legal authorities themselves.189 As a result, this reality makes it 
difficult to break the grip on market share by the entities prom-
ulgating UPL rules.190 However, as most economists agree, it is 
important to protect competition in the marketplace as unre-
strained competition is a public good and essential to the wealth 
of a nation.191 Indeed, protection of the open market drives political 
action in the fields of union power, antitrust, and other free 
market principles.192 This same mentality and drive towards action 
should be mirrored in the legal market. 
 What is clear is that once UPL rules are eliminated by the 
respective legal authorities, other players will be able to enter 
the market; this inevitably will have the effect of driving down 
prices and eliminating monopoly power.193 LegalZoom itself was 
born amid a thriving UPL-dominated market.194 Should the bar-
riers to access be eliminated, innovation and competition will 
surely pour into the market and build upon what LegalZoom has 
started.195 From there, innovation is a reasonable expectation in 
the marketplace for legal services,196 and with that innovation 
society can finally provide effective legal representation and 
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CONCLUSION
 UPL laws have been propagated and sold as an effective 
measure of consumer protection for legal services, specifically, 
“the need of the public for integrity and competence of those who 
undertake to render legal services.”198 Their rise in the early 
twentieth century was indeed premised by their creators on this 
notion,199 and today they are widespread throughout every state.200
 However, as technology progressed, the purported pur-
pose of UPL rules began to lose credibility.201 This is exemplified 
by the alarming statistics that the monopoly on legal services by 
lawyers has created: a disjunction between parties who desper-
ately need legal services and access to those services.202 The 
mechanism used to “protect members of the public from unquali-
fied representation” instead has become a hindrance to members 
of the public from obtaining any representation at all.203
 Legal software has the potential to fill in the gap where 
justice is void.204 By providing legal services to communities at a 
lower cost, the justice gap will effectively be narrowed by increased 
access to such services.205 But it cannot be done efficiently with 
the existence of UPL rules, which on their face, bar the activities 
of legal software and unlicensed representation and have created 
an era of uncertainty on the future of legal software.206
 Once UPL statutes are no longer a barrier to entry, an in-
flux of sellers will drive down market prices.207 Even further, 
players in the market will attempt to innovate on existing legal 
198 See Denckla, supra note 82, at 2593 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT EC 3-1 (1981)). 
199 See id.; Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 714–15. 
200 See Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 714.
201 Compare Rosman, supra note 114, at 77 (critiquing UPL rules’ effects 
on lawyers working remotely in different states they are not licensed in), with
Brown, supra note 6, at 160 (exploring common legal problems that can be ad-
dressed with legal software). 
202 Brown, supra note 6, at 160. 
203 Rosman, supra note 114, at 76. 
204 See Brown, supra note 6, at 157. 
205 Id.
206 PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39. 
207 Kasper, supra note 163. 
2020] A NEW ERA OF LEGAL SERVICES 271 
goods and services to increase their own profits, leading to better 
quality representation at a more affordable price for consum-
ers.208 The solution is quite simple on its face then, eliminate 
UPL rules and allow the free market to innovate the future of 
legal services. To the current players in the legal monopoly, this 
is a handful to accept.209 With control of monopoly prices leading 
to extraordinary gains,210 the current monopolists of the legal 
world will have a tough time allowing other competitors to enter 
the market.211 Given that the gatekeepers of the monopoly power 
on legal services are lawyers, judges, and other individuals in the 
legal field themselves, it will be challenging to truly eliminate 
UPL statutes without resistance.212
 Should UPL rules be successfully eliminated, it is important 
to provide protections to consumers. This should begin with an 
expansion of legal malpractice to include any form of legal work 
regardless of whether the service is provided by a licensed attor-
ney, an unlicensed player, or legal software.213 In doing so, it will 
be important to distinguish a critical element of current mal-
practice law, the attorney-client relationship, to adapt to the new 
malpractice standards successfully.214
 Additionally, it is important to expand false advertising 
law to encompass otherwise misleading and inaccurate portray-
als of legal services by new players in the legal market.215 The 
basis for these claims are already cemented into federal and 
state law.216 However, to be effective when new technology and 
competitors enter the legal market, the same principles that apply 
to law firms and lawyers regarding false advertising claims will 
have to apply to the new market similarly.217 This means that 
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any restriction or regulation affecting current players will have 
to apply to unlicensed attorneys and legal software.218 It is cru-
cial that with such a leap to an open market for legal services, 
equal protections follow to ensure a smooth and efficient transition. 
 In an increasingly technological and global society, it is 
finally time to let the leashes go on the legal monopoly.219 In 
doing so, it is wise to follow the new players in the market while 
also staying wary of the legal implications that will follow. However, 
in society’s interest and those who have been most adversely af-
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